We introduce the notion of local computation mechanism design -designing game theoretic mechanisms that run in polylogarithmic time and space. Local computation mechanisms reply to each query in polylogarithmic time and space, and the replies to different queries are consistent with the same global feasible solution. When the mechanism employs payments, the computation of the payments is also done in polylogarithmic time and space. Furthermore, the mechanism needs to maintain incentive compatibility with respect to the allocation and payments.
INTRODUCTION
Assume that we would like to design an auction for millions of buyers and items. Alternatively, we have a cloud of hundreds of thousands of computers on which we would like to schedule several millions of jobs. In the not-so-distant past, these ideas would have been unthinkable, but today, technological advances, especially the Internet, have led us to the point where they are not only possible, but necessary. One can easily conceive a cloud computation with thousands of selfish computers, each one wanting to minimize its work load. Alternatively, an ad-auction for millions of businesses competing for advertising on millions of websites does not appear to be a far away dream. In cases like these, the data sets on which we need to work are so large, that polynomialtime tractability may not be enough. Sometimes, even computing a solution in linear time may be infeasible. Often, however, only parts of the solution to a problem are re-quired at each point in time. In such cases, we can use local computation algorithms (LCAs).
Local computation algorithms, which were introduced by [Rubinfeld et al. 2011] consider the scenario in which we need to be able to respond to queries (regarding a feasible solution) quickly, but we never need the entire solution at once. For example, in most auctions, this is a reasonable assumption. When queried, we need to be able to tell each buyer which items she received and how much to pay; for a given item we need to tell the seller to whom and when to ship the item. There is no need to calculate the entire allocation and payment at any specific time or to commit the entire solution to memory. Having an LCA for such an auction would mean that we can reply to queries in polylogarithmic time and only require polylogarithmic space. Furthermore, if all of the items and buyers are queried, combining the results will give us a complete solution that meets our requirements.
The field of algorithmic mechanism design is an area at the intersection of economic game theory and algorithm design, whose objective is to design mechanisms in decentralized strategic environments. These mechanisms need to take into account both the algorithmic efficiency considerations and the selfish behavior of the participating agents.
In this paper we propose local computation mechanism design which shares the motivations of both local computation algorithms and algorithmic mechanism design. Our abstract model is the following: We have a large data-set and a set of allowable queries. Our goal is to implement each query locally, with polylogarithmic time and space, while maintaining the incentives of participants. It is worthwhile to give a few illustrative examples:
(1) Consider the problem of assigning doctor interns to hospitals internships, the classical motivation for stable matching. We would like to be able to compute, for each doctor, her assigned hospital, without performing the entire global computation. (2) Consider a large distributed data center that has to assign jobs to machines and elicits from each machine its speed. When queried on a job, we would like to reply to which machine it is assigned, and when queried regarding a machine, we would like to reply with the set of jobs that need to run on it. Again, we would like the computation to be local, without constructing a global solution, and still be able to ensure the machines have an incentive to report their speeds truthfully. (3) Consider a large auction (for instance, an ad auction platform). When queried regarding a bidder, we would like to compute the items she receives and her payment; when queried on an item, we would like to compute which bidder won it, and it's price. Again, we would like guarantee that the bidders have an incentive to report their preferences truthfully.
The following are our main contributions. First, we formalize the notion of local computation mechanism design. A mechanism is local if, for every query, it calculates an allocation (and a payment) in polylogarithmic time and space. Furthermore, the allocation must be consistent with some global solution, and the payment must ensure truthfulness of the agents. Second, we present local computation mechanisms for several interesting problems, where our main result is an LCA for stable matching. Third, we use our techniques to show that in the general case when the men's lists have bounded length (even in cases that do not admit an LCA), we can find arbitrarily good matchings (up to both additive and multiplicative constants) by truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm to a constant number of rounds.
We provide LCAs for the following problems:
Stable matching. In the stable matching (or stable marriage) problem, introduced by [Gale and Shapley 1962] , we would like to find a stable perfect matching between a group of n men and a group of n women 1 . We focus on the model introduced by [Immorlica and Mahdian 2005] , in which the the women can have arbitrary preferences over the men, and the men have preference lists of length k over the women, sampled uniformly at random.
Our main result is a local computation algorithm which matches all but an arbitrarily small fraction of the participants (this is often called an almost stable matching; see, e.g., [Tseng and Lee 1984; Lu and Zheng 2003] ). Furthermore, limited to the matched participants, the matching is stable.
Scheduling on related machines. In the makespan minimization problem, we want to schedule n jobs on m machines so as to minimize the maximal running time (makespan) of the machines. This problem has many variations; we consider the scenario in which m identical jobs need to be allocated among n related machines. The machines are strategic agents, whose private information is their speed. We show:
(1) A local mechanism that is truthful in expectation for scheduling on related machines, which provides an O(log log n)-approximation to the optimal makespan. (2) A local mechanism that is universally truthful for the restricted case (i.e., when each job can run on one of at most a constant number of predetermined machines), which provides an O(log log n)-approximation to the optimal makespan.
We also show some subtle and surprising results on the truthfulness of our algorithms.
Matching combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are auctions in which buyers can bid on bundles of items. We consider the following scenario: m items are to be auctioned off to n unit-demand buyers, where each buyer is interested in a set of at most k items, sampled uniformly at random. We show universally truthful local mechanisms for the following variations, both of which provide a 1/2-approximation to the optimal solution:
(1) When all buyers have an identical valuation for the items in their sets, 2 and the buyers' private information is the sets of items they are interested in. (2) When the sets are public knowledge, and the buyers' private information is their valuation.
We also show that there cannot exist an (exact) LCA for maximum matching, and therefore, there cannot exist any local mechanism which computes the optimal solution.
Combinatorial auctions with k-single minded bidders. If each buyer is interested in a set of at most k items, sampled uniformly at random, and has private valuation for this set, we show a universally truthful local mechanism which admits a 1/k-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD). We show that in the housing allocation setting, in which each agent is interested in a constant number of houses, sampled uniformly at random, the RSD algorithm is implementable as an LCA.
Related Work
Local Computation Algorithms: [Rubinfeld et al. 2011] showed how to transform distributed algorithms to LCAs, and gave LCAs for several problems, including maximal independent set and hypergraph 2-coloring. [Alon et al. 2012 ] expanded the work of [Rubinfeld et al. 2011] and gave better space bounds for maximal independent set and hypergraph 2-coloring, using query trees. Query trees were introduced in the local setting by [Nguyen and Onak 2008] : a random permutation of the vertices is generated, and a sequential algorithm is simulated on this order. The query tree represents the dependence of each query on the results of previous queries. [ Nguyen and Onak 2008] showed that if the graph has a bounded degree, the query tree has a constant expected size. [Alon et al. 2012] showed that the query tree has polylogarithmic size with high probalility, and that the space required by the algorithm can be reduced by using a random seed to generate the ordering. [Mansour et al. 2012] showed that the size of the query tree can be bounded, with high probability, by O(log n), and showed how it is possible to transform many on-line algorithms to LCAs. Using this technique, they showed LCAs for maximal matching and several machine scheduling problems. [Mansour and Vardi 2013] showed an LCA which finds a (1 − )-approximation to the maximum matching. Mechanism Design: We divide our attention between two types of mechanisms: with and without payments. When the mechanism designer can incorporate payments (to or from participating parties), these payments are usually used to guarantee incentive compatibility or "truthfulness" ([Mas-Collel et al. 1995] , [Nisan and Ronen 1999] ): the agents are rationally motivated to truthfully reveal their private information. The mechanisms with payments discussed in this paper are all randomized, and there are several quantifications of truthfulness for such mechanisms in the literature, e.g., [Fiat et al. 2013; Hoefer et al. 2013] . We focus on the two most widely accepted (e.g., [Nisan and Ronen 1999; Archer and Tardos 2001; Lehmann et al. 2002; Dobzinski and Dughmi 2009; Dobzinski et al. 2012] ): truthfulness in expectation, in which the expectation of each agent's utility is maximized by being truthful (where the expectation is taken over the coin flips of the mechanism), and universal truthfulness, where each agent's utility is maximized by being truthful, regardless of the realization of the randomness of the mechanism. When the mechanism does not support payments, it is sometimes impossible to guarantee truthfulness without crippling restrictions to the mechanism [Arrow 1950 ]. In such cases, it is common to look at (Bayesian) ex-ante truthfulness 3 , in which the expectation of each agent's utility is maximized by being truthful (where the expectation is taken over the prior distribution of the other agents' private information).
Mechanisms are generally required to run in time (and space) polynomial in the size of the input. In cases when the optimal solution can be calculated in polynomial time and space, one can apply the well-known VCG payments [Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973] . Unfortunately, these payments can only be applied when the optimal solution can be computed [Nisan and Ronen 1999; Lehmann et al. 2002] , and in many cases, it has been shown that computing an optimal solution is NP-hard [Nisan and Ronen 1999; Dobzinski 2011] . In these cases, we can only hope to design algorithms that approximate the optimal solution in polynomial time. Additional Related Work: Because of the large variety of game-theoretic settings considered in this paper, instead of listing the entire glossary of related game-theoretic works here, we provide a short subsection dedicated to related work pertaining to each topic at the start of the relevant sections in the full version of the paper.
Paper Organization
In Section 2 we give some general definitions and notation which we will use in the rest of the paper, and present our model for local computation game theoretic mechanisms. In Section 3 we present our LCA for stable matching. In Section 4 we show some properties of the (global) Gale-Shapley algorithm that can be derived using our proof techniques. We defer the rest of our results to the appendices. In Section 5, we show that our LCA for stable matching is ex-ante truthful. In Section 6 we state the rest of our results, the proofs of which can be found in the full version of the paper.
OUR MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES

Local Computation Algorithms
The model we use is a generalization of the model of local computation algorithms (LCAs) introduced by [Rubinfeld et al. 2011] .
4 A (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-local computation algorithm LA for a computational problem is a (randomized) algorithm that receives an input of size n, and a query x. Algorithm LA replies to query x in time t(n) and uses at most s(n) memory, with probability at least 1 − δ(n). Furthermore, the replies to all of the possible queries are consistent and combine to a feasible solution to the problem. That is, the algorithm always replies correctly, but there is a δ(n) probability that the time and/or space bounds will be violated.
Mechanism Design
In this paper, we consider several different game theoretic setting -it would be cumbersome to introduce notation and preliminaries for all of these settings in one place. Instead, in this section, we provide only some very broad terms and defer the settingspecific preliminaries to the respective sections of the full version of the paper.
We use the standard notation of game theoretic mechanisms. There is a set N of n rational agents and a set M of m objects. In some settings, e.g., the stable marriage setting, there are no objects, only rational agents. The agents have some private valuation function for the objects. We would like to allocate items to agents (or possibly agents to other agents), in order to meet global goal, e.g., maximize the sum of the valuations of allocated objects (see, e.g., [Nisan et al. 2005] ).
A mechanism with payments M = (A, P) is composed of an allocation function A, which allocates items to agents, and a payment scheme P, which assigns each agent a payment. A mechanism without payments consists only of an allocation function.
We say mechanism M is truthful if it is a dominant strategy for all agents to report their true private valuation. We distinguish between several measures of truthfulness, which we will discuss in the relevant sections.
Local Computation Mechanisms
Definition 2.1 (Mechanisms without payments). We say that a mechanism M is (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-local if its allocation function is computed by a (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-local computation algorithm.
Definition 2.2 (Mechanisms with payments). We say that a mechanism M = (A, P) is (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-local if both the allocation function A and the payment scheme P are computed by (t(n), s(n), δ(n))-local computation algorithms.
In other words, given a query x, A computes an allocation and P computes a payment, and both run in time t(n) and space s(n) with probability at least 1 − δ(n). Furthermore, the replies of A to all queries of combine to a feasible allocation.
A truthful local mechanism M = (A, P) is a local mechanism which is also truthful. Namely, each agent's dominant bid is her true valuation, regardless of the fact that the mechanism is local.
STABLE MATCHING
The stable matching problem is represented by a tuple A = (M, W, P ), where M is the set of men, W is set of women, and P is the set of preference relations of the men and the women: each man m ∈ M has a preference relation over the women: if m prefers w to w we denote this by w m w . Similarly there is a preference relationship w for each woman w.
Related work. Stable matching has been at the center of game-theoretic research since the seminal paper of [Gale and Shapley 1962] (see, e.g., [Roth 2003 ] for an introduction and a summary of many important results). [Roth and Rothblum 1999] examined the scenario in which the preference lists are of bounded length; in most real-life scenarios, this is indeed the case. For example, a medical student will not submit a preference list for internship over all of the hospitals in the United States. Furthermore, the mechanism designer in most of these cases de facto decides on the list length because the mechanism will usually require the men to submit a list of some predetermined length. It is known that a linear number of iterations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is necessary to attain stability [Gusfield and Irving 1989] , and several works address the situation when we are interested in a sublinear number of queries. [Feder et al. 2000 ] propose a parallel sublinear time algorithm for stable matching. Unfortunately, it is not possible to convert their algorithm to a local computation algorithm. Several experimental works on parallel algorithms for the stable matching problem provide evidence that after a constant number of rounds, the matching is almost stable (e.g., [Tseng and Lee 1984; Quinn 1985; Lu and Zheng 2003] ). [Floréen et al. 2010] show that in the special case when both the mens' and the womens' preference lists are bound by a constant, there exists a distributed version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which can be run for a constant number of rounds and finds an almost stable matching.
We examine the variant in which each man m ∈ M is interested in at most k women, (and prefers to be unmatched than to be matched to anyone not on their list; cf. [Roth and Rothblum 1999] ). We limit our attention to the setting in which the men's preference are assumed to be uniformly distributed; cf. [Immorlica and Mahdian 2005; Kojima and Pathak 2009] . The stable matching problem (M, W, P ) where each man has a preference list of length k and each woman is chosen uniformly at random is called k-uniform.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm finds a stable matching in the k-uniform setting (e.g., [Gale and Sotomayor 1985] ). To assure the locality of our algorithm, we allow our mechanism to "disqualify" men, in which case they remain unmatched, but are unable to contest the matching. We try, however, to keep the number of disqualified men to a minimum. Our main result is the following. THEOREM 3.2. Let A = (M, W, P ) be a stable matching problem, |M | = |W | = n, in the k-uniform setting. Then there is an (O(log n), O(log n), 1/n)-local computation mechanism for A in which at most an O(1/k) fraction of the men remain unmatched.
We begin by describing a non-local algorithm, ABRIDGEDGS, and then show how to simulate it locally by a local algorithm, LOCALAGS.
ABRIDGEDGS
Let ABRIDGEDGS be the Gale-Shapley men's courtship algorithm, where, in addition to the preference lists being of constant length, the algorithm is stopped after rounds. That is, in each round, each unassigned man goes to the highest ranked woman who has not yet rejected him. Each woman then keeps the man she prefers out of the men who approached her, and rejects the rest. This continues until the th round, and the men who were rejected on the th round are disqualified. (Note that the men who were rejected k times are left unmatched as well, but they are not said to be disqualified.) We simulate ABRIDGEDGS using an LCA.
LOCALAGS -an LCA Implementation of ABRIDGEDGS
Consider a graph which represents the problem, where the men and the women are represented by vertices, and an edge exists between two vertices if and only if they are on each other's list. Define the distance between two agents to be the length of the shortest path between them in the graph. Define the d-neighborhood of a person v to be everyone at a distance at most
Assume we are queried on a specific man, m 1 . We simulate ABRIDGEDGS locally as follows: Let the number of rounds be = 2k 2 (see Lemma 3.7). We look at the 2 -neighborhood of m 1 . For each man m i ∈ N 2 (m 1 ), we simulate round 1. Then, for each man m i ∈ N 2 −2 (m 1 ), we simulate round 2. And so on, until for m i ∈ N 2 (m 1 ), that is, m 1 and his closest male neighbors, we simulate round . We return the woman to whom m 1 is paired, "unassigned" if he was rejected by k women, and "disqualified" if he was rejected by a woman in round . We denote this algorithm by LOCALAGS. CLAIM 3.3. For any two men, m i and m j , whose distance from each other is greater than 2 , m i 's actions cannot affect m j if Algorithm ABRIDGEDGS terminates after rounds.
PROOF. The proof is by induction. For = 1, let w 1 be m j 's first choice. Only men for whom w 1 is their first choice can affect m j , and these are a subset of the men at distance 2 from m j . For the inductive step, assume that the claim holds for − 1. Assume that there is a man m i whose actions can affect m j within rounds, who is at a distance of at least 2 + 2 from m j . From the inductive claim, none of m i 's actions can affect any of m j 's neighbors within − 1 rounds. As their actions in round − 1 (or any previous round) will not be affected by m i , and they are the only ones who can affect m j in round , it follows that m i cannot affect m j within rounds. COROLLARY 3.4. The query of a man m's status in round only needs to consider men at distance at most 2 from m.
LEMMA 3.5. The running time and space of algorithm LOCALAGS is O(log n) with probability at least 1 − 1/n 2 .
We prove the following claim, which immediately implies Lemma 3.5. and we can take c i = kc i−1 . Otherwise, we use the law of total probability.
where the last inequality uses the inductive hypothesis. The probability that the degree of any node u is exactly z is at most
and Pr[deg(u) = z] ≤ e − z , where z = max{0, z − e 2 k}. We like to bound the probability that N i v is larger than c i log n although N i−1 v is less than c i−1 log n. We define a new random variable N i v as follows. Let y ≤ c i−1 log n be the number of nodes at distance i − 1 from v and let z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z y ) be their degrees. We define the truncated degrees as z = { z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z y } such that z j = max{0, z j − e 2 k}. The value of N i v is the sum of the truncated degrees at distance i − 1 from v, i.e.,
The probability that the truncated degrees of the vertices at distance i − 1 are exactly z = ( z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z y ) is at most ≤ y], for x ≥ 7y as follows:
It follows that
which follows since c i−1 ≥ 3. Therefore for c i = (e 2 k + 7)c i−1 ≤ (16k) i we have,
Claim 3.6 implies Algorithm LOCALAGS makes O(log n) queries with probability at least 1/n 2 , and so Lemma 3.5 follows.
LEMMA 3.7. In Algorithm LOCALAGS, setting = 2k 2 ensures at most 4n/k men remain unmatched with probability at least 1 − 1 n 2 . Note: This implies that the mechanism can limit the number of unmatched pairs with a high degree of certainty by specifying the length of the list.
Lemmas 3.5 and 3.7 imply Theorem 3.2. We prove Lemma 3.7 in the following subsection; the proof follows from Claims 3.9 and 3.11.
Bounding the Number of Men Removed
To prove Lemma 3.7, we bound the number of men remaining unassigned due to the fact that the lists are short, and the number of men disqualified due to the number of rounds being bounded.
3.3.1. Removal due to short lists. We bound the number of unpaired women as a result of the fact that the lists are short, using the principle of deferred decisions [Knuth 1976] 6 . Note that the number of unpaired women equals the number of unpaired men.
LEMMA 3.8. In the k-uniform setting, the Gale-Shapley algorithm results in at most 2n k men being unpaired, with probability at least 1 − 1/2n 2 .
PROOF. Consider the following stochastic process: in the first round, each of the n men chooses a woman independently and uniformly at random. For each consecutive round, for each woman that has been chosen by at least one man, one of the men remains married to her (arbitrarily chosen), and the others remain single and choose again. This process repeats for k rounds. This is modeled by the functions f t : M → W , where in round t, f t maps each single man to a woman uniformly at random and each married man to the same woman. Let F be the set of all possible allocation functions
For ease of analysis, we assume that each man can choose the same woman again, as the number of free women in this case is an upper bound to the number of free women in the system where he can not. Note that the number of unmatched men after t rounds is identical to the number of unmatched men after t rounds of the Gale-Shapley process. This stochastic process, however, terminates after k rounds, whereas the GaleShapley process can continue. As the number of matched men can only increase when more rounds are added, the number of unmatched men created by the process is an upper bound to the number of unmatched men created by the Gale-Shapley process.
Let X t j be the indicator variable which is 1 if woman j is unassigned at the end of round t. Let X t = n j=1 X t j . The following claim implies Lemma 3.8. CLAIM 3.9. For any constant t,
The proof is by induction. The base of the induction, t = 1, is immediate. For the inductive step, assume that after round t, X t = n/z (for some z > 0). In round
For the rest of the proof, assume X t ≤ 2n t , and fix X t to be some such value. We get
using e x > 1 + x. Order the women arbitrarily, (W = {1, 2, . . . n}), and let W i = {1, 2, . . . i}. For h ∈ F , define the martingale
where X t+1 (f t+1 ) is the realization of X t+1 given that the allocation vector is f t+1 . Note that Y t+1 0 (h) is the expected value of X t+1 over all possible functions f t+1 ; that is, the expected number of unmatched women after t + 1 rounds. Y t+1 n (h) is the number of unmatched women after t + 1 rounds when the allocation function is h. X t+1 satisfies the Lipschitz condition, because if h and h only differ on the allocation of one man,
(see, e.g. [Alon and Spencer 2008] ), and so we can apply Azuma's inequality, from which we get
, we have that
Therefore, since we assume that
From the induction hypothesis and Equations (1), (2) and (3), using the union bound,
The stochastic process for which Claim 3.9 holds ends at least as early as the GaleShapley algorithm with short lists; therefore Claim 3.9 implies Lemma 3.8 3.3.2. Removal due to the number of rounds being limited. Because we stop the LOCALAGS algorithm after a constant ( ) number of rounds, it is possible that some men who "should have been" matched are disqualified because they were rejected by their i th choice in round (i < k). We show that this number cannot be very large.
Let R i denote the number of men rejected in round i ≥ 1.
OBSERVATION 3.10. R i is monotone decreasing in i.
CLAIM 3.11. The number of men rejected in round i is at most n k i . PROOF. As each man can be rejected at most k times, the total number of rejections possible is kn. The number of men who can be rejected in round i is at most
Where Inequality 4 is due to Observation 3.10.
SOME GENERAL PROPERTIES OF THE GALE-SHAPLEY ALGORITHM
We use the results and ideas of Section 3 to prove some interesting features of the (general) Gale-Shapley stable matching algorithm, when the mens' lists are of length at most k. (These results immediately extend to our local version of the algorithm, LOCALAGS.) Note that the proof of Claim 3.11 makes no assumption on how the men's selection is made, and therefore, Claim 3.11 implies that as long as each man's list is bounded by k, if we run the Gale-Shapley for rounds, at most nk men will be rejected in that round. This immediately gives us an additive approximation bound for the algorithm if we stop after rounds. COROLLARY 4.1 (TO CLAIM 3.11). Assume that the output of the Gale-Shapley algorithm on a stable matching problem, where the preference lists of the men are of length at most k, is a matching of size M * . Then, stopping the Gale Shapley algorithm after rounds will result in a matching of size at least M * − nk .
We would like to also provide a multiplicative bound. Henceforth, we assume that the mens' list length is bounded by k, but make no other assumptions. For each round i, let M i be the size of the current matching; let D i be the number of men who have already approached all k women on their list and have been rejected by all of them; let C i be the number of men who were rejected by women in round i, but have approached fewer than k women so far; recall that R i is the number of men rejected in round i. Denote the size of the matching returned by the un-truncated Gale-Shapley algorithm by M * .
CLAIM 4.2. C k+1 ≤ kM * .
PROOF. Note that
Hence,
COROLLARY 4.3. For every > 0, there exists a constant > 0 such that C ≤ M * .
PROOF. Denote the maximum number of rejections possible from round i onwards by L i . Clearly,
For all i such that C i ≥ M * , we have
Therefore, from Claim 4.2,
Putting everything together, we have,
This gives us, THEOREM 4.4. Consider a stable matching problem. Let each man's list be bounded by k. Denote the size of the stable matching returned by the Gale-Shapley algorithm by M * . Then, if the process is stopped after O( k log k ) rounds, the matching returned is at most a (1 + )-approximation to M * , and has at most M * unstable couples.
COROLLARY 4.5. If both men and women have lists of length at most k, then for any there is an (O(1), O(1), 0)-LCA for stable matching which returns a matching that is at most a (1 + )-approximation to the matching returned by the Gale-Shapley algorithm, and with at most an -fraction of the edges being unstable.
EX-ANTE TRUTHFULNESS OF LOCALAGS
It is known that the Gale-Shapley men's courtship algorithm is strategy-proof for the men but not for the women (see, e.g., [Maschler et al. 2013] ). Unfortunately, Algorithm LOCALAGS is neither strategy-proof for the men nor for the women: for the women, this follows immediately from the fact that the men's courtship algorithm is not strategy-proof; for the men -a man who was rejected in round might prefer to not declare the woman from which he was rejected in that round. It is possible, though, to show that LOCALAGS is ex-ante truthful. The men have a preference relation over the women (and women over the men). However, it is not clear how to calculate the expected utility in this case, so for the purposes of the proof, assume the men have a utility function u : W → R. The utility of the men for women not among their first k preferences is 0. Note that LOCALAGS has no access to the utilities themselves, but only to the preferences, therefore the only way for a man to manipulate the algorithm is by misrepresenting his preference vector.
Assume that man m's real utility function is t This implies that given that a utilities function has a fixed list of outcomes, it is possible to reach any permutation of the utilities from any other by a finite series of swaps. Take any legal chain of swaps from t m to b m : < t m = u 1 , u 2 , . . . u i , . . . , u n = b m >. There must be two consecutive functions, u i and u i+1 on the chain, for which
from the transitivity of the relation ">". Functions u i and u i+1 differ in the utilities of two women, say w x and w y : u i (w x ) = u i+1 (w y ), u i (w y ) = u i+1 (w x ). Denote by B −m the set of all preferences which is reached by taking B −m and interchanging women w x and w y wherever they appear. Likewise the preference vectors of women w x and w y are interchanged. Note that B −m = B −m , because they are both uniform distributions over all possible preference vectors. By symmetry, it must hold that
in contradiction to Equation (5).
Similarly, CLAIM 5.4. Algorithm LOCALAGS is ex-ante truthful for the women.
